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The Independence of the Judiciary: A
Critical Aspect of the Confirmation
Process
By RANDALL R. RADER*
On October 9, 1987, after the outcome of the vote on his
nomination to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court was
no longer in doubt, Judge Robert H. Bork explicitly raised the
specter of a threat to the independence of the judiciary during
confirmation proceedings. In announcing his decision to seek a
vote despite the certainty of an unfavorable outcome, Judge
Bork stated:
The process of confirming justices for our nation's highest
court has been transformed in a way that should not and
indeed must not be permitted to occur again. The tactics and
techmques of national political campaigns have been unleashed
on the process of confirmng judges. This is not simply disturbing, it is dangerous. Federal judges are not appointed to
decide cases according to the latest opinion polls. They are
appointed to decide cases according to law But when judicial
nominees are assessed and treated like political candidates, the
effect will be to chill the climate in which judicial deliberations
take place, to erode public confidence in the impartiality of
courts and to endanger the independence of the judiciaryI
This assessment of the nomination process might be discounted because it was made by Judge Bork during the "heat
of the battle." To some degree, however, Judge Bork's opinion
was echoed by the reflections of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who twice passed through the confirmation process. In a
* Judge, United States Claims Court, Washington, D.C., B.A., Brigham Young
University, 1974; J.D., George Washington University National Law Center, 1978.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1987, at 13 (transcript of statement delivered by Judge
Bork at the White House on Oct. 9, 1987).
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recent address to the Bicentennial Australian Legal Convention,
Chief Justice Rehnquist made the following observations:
It is not surprising that in our country both the President and
some members of the Senate are interested in trying to predict
The difficulty
how a new member of our Court will vote.
the questions begin to go into great decomes when
Judges should not and do not behave like legislators,
tail
or like anyone else who is free to commit himself to a result
We need to work out
for reasons apart from the merits
[a]
something halfway between the question which elicit[s]
one sentence response, and 2 the prolonged interrogation involved in the Bork hearings.
These commentaries raise three fundamental questions about
the Senate's role in the judicial selection process. First, under
what circumstances, if ever, are detailed ideological inquiries
justified during the confirmation process? Second, when ideological inquiry is justified, what should be the scope of that
review 9 Third, at what juncture do concerns about the independence of the judiciary acquire a legitimate role in the Senate's
proceedings? This Article addresses these questions by reference
to the history of the drafting of the Constitution and the Senate's
past practice in confirmation proceedings.
Under the Constitution's judicial selection process, 145 individuals have been nominated and 113 appointed to the Supreme Court in nearly two hundred years.3 Studies of these
confirmations 4 have identified several functions of the advice
and consent process. These functions include: (1) examination

2 Address by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Bicentennial Australian Legal
Convention, 29 August 1988, at 4-5, II, 12-13 [hereinafter Address].
3 H. ABRAAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS
TO THE SuPREEm COURT 386-91 (1985) (table updated by author); L. TRIE, GOD SAVE

Tmis

HONORABLE COURT

142-51 (1985) (table updated by author).

See, e.g., H. ABRAHA, supra note 3; L. TRIBE, supra note 3; Freidman, Tribal
Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J.
1283 (1986); Rees, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings:
Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. R~v 913 (1983); Ross, The Functions, Roles,
and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY
L. REv 633 (1987).
4
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of the nominee's overall physical, 5 mental, 6 legal, 7 and ethical
qualifications;' (2) protection against favoritism or nepotism in
the executive appointment power; 9 (3) provision for public discourse on nomnnations; 0 and (4) investigation of the nominee's
political and judicial philosophy " This last function is the focus
both of this Article and of the foremost current legal debate
over the Constitution's appointments clause.

I. TRIGGERING SCRUTINY OF JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
The initial issue of debate concermng the appointment of
Supreme Court justices is under what circumstances an ideologI In many instances, the Senate has inquired into the physical fitness of nominees.
Two examples are Sherman Minton, Hearings on the Nomination of Sherman Minton
to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1949) (Committee inquires into
past serious illness of nominee), and Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist, Hearingson the
Nomination of William H. Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States, 99th
Cong., 2d Srss. 299, 366-7 (1986) [hereinafter Hearingson Justice Rehnquist] (Committee
inquires into Rehnquist's physical ability to serve as Chief Justice and discussed the use
of his medical records in the hearings).
6 Questions of mental stability and health entered into the Senate's decision to
reject President Washington's nomination of John Rutledge to be Chief Justice. See
infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
7 The Senate invariably examines closely the professional credentials and qualifications of nominees. In at least two instances-G. Harrold Carswell, see infra notes
135-37 and accompanying text, and Alexander Wolcott, see infra note 89 and accompanying text-the Senate's perception that a nomnee lacked adequate legal qualifications
influenced its decision to refuse confirmation.
' Ethical improprieties influenced the Senate's decision to reject in one case,
Clement Haynsworth, see infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text, and influenced a
nominee to withdraw from consideration before the Senate in another, Abe Fortas, see
infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
I Charges that the President had allowed personal favoritism to influence the
nomination decision helped doom the confirmation chances of two nominees, Abe
Fortas, see notes 126-32a and accompanying text; McConnell, Haynsworth and Carswell.
,4 New Senate Standard of Excellence, 59 Ky. L.J. 7, 30-31 (1971); and Homer Thornberry, see infra note 154 and accompanying text.
,0 The public hearings on the nomination of Justice Rehnquist to be Chief Justice
afforded thirty-nine individuals to testify on behalf of themselves and a wide variety of
organizations. Among the organizations represented in testimony were the National
Organization of Women, the NAACP, the American Bar Association, the United Families Foundation, the Lea4ership Conference on Civil Rights, and more. Hearingson the
Nommatioil of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United
States, 99th Cong.,'2d Sess. iii-v (1986); see also Ross, supra note 4, at 677-81.
" The most prominent example of examination of a nominee's personal political
and judicial views was the proceedings on the nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork, see
infra notes 187-205 and accompanying text.
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ical inquiry is justified. On this question, two primary positions
emerge from the comrmentaries of legal writers and Senators.
The predominant viewpoint among scholars is that the Senate
has been and should remain free to engage in ideological scrutiny
at its will.' 2 A strong dissent to this viewpoint, however, is
registered in some academic circles." This dissent argues that
undue ideological scrutiny in the Senate subjects the sensitive
judicial selection process and the third branch itself to unsavory
and inappropriate political persuasion. Accordingly, these commentators contend that the Senate should confine its confirmation proceedings to an examination of a nominee's professional
4
qualifications.1
A responsible compromise position, which this Article contends is supported by constitutional history and Senate precedent, was propounded by the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. The Senator noted that "under normal circumstances," most Senators have opted "not to consider questions
of judicial philosophy," restricting their assessment of the nominee to "questions of character and of competence.'1 5 When,
however, a President makes a nomination primarily on the basis
of judicial philosophy in a "determined attempt to bend the
Supreme Court to [the President's] political ends," then the
Senator contended that the Senate may check the President by6
considering judicial philosophy in the confirmation process.
This viewpoint is consistent with the Senate's role as a check on
the President's appointment authority 17 This compromise position requires the Senate to assess carefully the circumstances of
each appointment. Where the President has nominated a preeminently qualified candidate, however, senatorial suppositions
, L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 141; Rees, supra note 4, at 923-26; Ross, supra note
4, at 634-35. Note that this determination is not necessarily a function of political
allegiance. Professor Tribe has been widely heralded as a prospective judicial candidate
in a Democratic admimstration, while Professor Rees served in the Justice Department
during the Reagan Admimstration.
"1Freidman, supra note 4; Hatch, Save This Court From What?, 99 HA.v. L.
Rav 1347 (1986); McConnell, supra note 9, at 13, 32-34.
14 Freidman, supra note 4; Hatch, supra note 13; McConnell, supra note 9, at 13,
32-34.
" 133 CoNo. Rac. S10,527 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Biden).
16 Id.

at S10,529.

" See infra notes 79, 84-86 and accompanying text.
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about the potential motivation of "bending the Supreme Court
to [the President's] ends" are strongly counterbalanced by the
Chief Executive's readily apparent motivation of selecting a worthy member of the Supreme Court. Further, the history of the
Constitution and prior Senate confirmation processes counsel
the Senate to proceed cautiously before undertaking a detailed
18
ideological inquiry and to restrain the scope of that process,

II.

THE SCOPE OF SCRUTINY

The second question posed by this Article has prompted the
largest degree of scholarly and senatorial commentary, namely,
what is the scope of the Senate's investigatory power once it has
determined to undertake some inquiry into judicial philosophy
or ideology As Chief Justice Rehnquist has accurately noted,
"[i]t is also accepted, though not so generally, that the Senate,
too, may consider the nominee's judicial philosophy in the exercise of its constitutional function of advising and consenting
to the nomination."' 19 The scope of this function, however, is
far from settled.
Each legal commentator on the confirmation process and
each Senator who actually exercises the advice and consent power
probably has a slightly different concept of the appropriate
degree of ideological inquiry For purposes of categorization,
however, these scholars and Senators again fall generally into
two camps. One camp advocates the "broadest view" of the
Senate's role in conducting ideological inquiries. 20 For example,
one senatorial expositor of unlimited ideological inquiry recommends that the Senate should weigh "the same factors the President did in making his choice," including the "candidate's
philosophy. ' 2 ' If a majority of the Senate differed markedly

" See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.

,1 Address, supra note 2, at 3.
20 133 CoNG. REc. S11,386 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Leahy urging

the Senate to view itself as "equal partners" with the President in the judicial selection

process); 133 CoNG. REc. S10,808 (daily ed. July 29, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Sanford);
133

CONG.

REc. S10,523 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Biden urging the

Senate to "take the broadest view of its constitutional responsibility"); id. at S10,636
(remarks of Sen. Simon urging the Senate to take an "active role"); Black, A Note on
SenatorialConsideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970).
2, 133 CONG. REc. S10,636 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Simon).
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from a President on judicial philosophy, this viewpoint could
conceivably cause an interbranch gridlock which could hold a
seat on the Supreme Court vacant for a prolonged period of
time.
Other scholars and Senators advocate strict limits on the
Senate's desires to scrutinize judicial philosophy 22 Another way
of stating this position is that the Senate should not inquire into
judicial philosophy at all. For example, one Senator postulated
that the people elected the President to "enable him to put his
'23
stamp on the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, with respect to deterniming the scope of Senate
review of a nominee's ideology during confirmation proceedings,
these viewpoints represent the two primary alternatives. The
advocates of unlimited review contend that the Senate may consider ideology to the extent of requiring "a particular judicial
philosophy in those people [it is] willing to confirm." 24 The
advocates of limited review contend that the Senate's "appropriate role
is to look at the character, the professional
qualifications, the fitness, if you will, of the nomnee''2 5 and
little more.
These alternatives, as they are used by the Senate, can be
cloaked in language that blurs the distinctions. Because both
camps agree the examination of judicial philosophy has some
role to play in the confirmation process, discerning the differences is often a matter of degree. As Chief Justice Rehnqmst
accurately described the recent confirmation process, "[t]he battle lines were drawn over whether Bork was 'in' or 'out' of the
'mainstream' of judicial thinking in the United States, with
proponents and opponents coming up with their own definition
of 'mainstream.' "26 Some distinctions, however, can be drawn
without delving into what each camp considers to be "mainstream" or "extremist."

2
133 CONG. REc. S11,269 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1987) (remarks of Sen. McConnell
urging the Senate to consider only the fitness of the nominee); 133 CONG. Rlc. S10,538

(daily ed. July 23, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Dole urging. the Senate to focus on the
nominee's "ability and integrity"); Freidman, supra note 4.
11 133 CONG. Rc. S10,275 (daily ed. July 21, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
14 133 CONG. REc. S11,386 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Leahy).
25 133 CONG. REc. S11,275 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1987) (remarks of Sen. McConnell).

1 Address, supra note 2, at 5.
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The unlimited review camp, for instance, feels justified in
rejecting a7 candidate who does not share the philosophy of a
majority of the Senate. The changing membership of the Senate
thus sets a changeable standard of acceptable judicial philosophy
for Supreme Court nominees. On the other hand, advocates of
strict limits on senatorial review would apparently rule out all
ideological inquiry in favor of a check on qualifications alone,
thus leaving the President alone to consider judicial philosophy
in candidates for the nation's highest court. To this prospect,
one Senator responded that "[t]he law shouldn't be a pendulum
that swings back and forth according to who is President." 2 7
Again, a middle ground on this question suggests that the
Senate exercise self-restraint according to a more objective standard when examimng ideology Past Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, Senator Thurmond, articulated this reasoned position:
Some have said that philosophy should not be considered at
all in the confirmation process.
I believe that a candidate's
philosophy may properly be considered, but philosophy should
not be the sole criteria for rejecting a nominee with one notable
exception. The one exception is when a nominee clearly does
not support the basic, long-standing consensus principles of
our Nation
I do not believe that philosophy alone should
bar a nominee from the Court unless that nominee holds a
belief that is so contrary to the fundamental, long-standing
principles of this country that a nominee's service would be
inconsistent with the very essence of this country's shared
values.3
Thus, according to this moderate restraint position, the Senate should only reject a candidate on the basis of judicial philosophy if that philosophy is contrary to "fundamental, longstanding principles.' '29 Senator Thurmond clarified what these
principles might include:

" Walsh and Peterson, Biden Cautions Democrats on Bork Vote, Wash. Post,
July 23, 1987, at A9 (statement of Sen. Simon).
"Hearings on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., ist Sess. 19 [hereinafter Hearings on Bork] (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
2

Id.
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[A] nominee's position [that justifies the Senate's rejection of
the candidate] should be unequivocal and in violation of a
basic belief. For example, freedom of speech is a fundamental,
accepted principle in this country; but exactly what constitutes
"speech" and whether or not there are limitations on any
particular activity, are issues on which reasonable people can
disagree
That discrimination based on race or national
origin is unacceptable is a basic tenet of this Nation; but there
certainly is not such agreement on the use of preferential
quotas.30
The distinction between advocates of moderate restraint and
advocates of unlimited scrutiny, however, can be drawn without
reference to the particular constitutional issues of the day The
advocates of strict limits rule out consideration of constitutional
issues to any significant degree. The advocates of unlimited
review subscribe to a subjective standard of what constitutes an
acceptable judicial philosophy In other words, adherents to this
latter position contend that a majority of the Senate at the time
of the nomination should determine the appropriate judicial
philosophy standard for a nominee seeking confirmation from
that body One unlimited review advocate explains: "[the Senate
must] pass judgment on whether or not [a nominee's] particular
philosophy is an appropriate one at this time in our history ",31
Thus, according to the unlimited review school, individual Senators are justified in voting against any candidate who does not
sufficiently share their personal judicial philosophy If a majority
of the Senate disagrees on that basis, the nominee is rejected.
On the other hand, the advocates of moderate restraint adopt
a more objective standard. In their view, only principles of
philosophy that could reasonably be considered fundamental,
long-standing, and accepted nationwide become the subject of
ideological scrutiny Moreover, individual Senators are not justified in voting against a nominee simply because of differences
in judicial philosophy The question is not what individual Senators believe is an appropriate judicial philosophy, but what can
reasonably be defined as clearly beyond the pale of reasonable
intellectual debate.

30

Id. at 19-20.

31

Id. at 66 (statement of Chairman Biden).
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In terms of specific issues, the differences between the unlimited review and restraint camps are differences of both subject

matter and degree. The unlimited review camp would consider
many more issues to be encompassed within the definition of
fundamental questions, including questions decided by the Su-

preme Court only recently. The advocates of restraint confine
the subject matter for ideological scrutiny to fewer principles,

which have been conclusively established for decades. Moreover
the unlimited review school would question any slight deviation

from the norms, while the restraint school tolerates a wider
deviance from its norms. The history of the Constitution and
prior Senate confirmation proceedings commend to the Senate a

course of restraint on those rare occasions when it becomes
necessay to undertake an inquiry into judicial philosophy.
III.

THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY FACTOR

With respect to the third question addressed by this Article,
the principle of an independent judiciary arises as a factor in
confirmations only when the Senate adjudges it necessary to
undertake extensive review of a candidate's judicial views. For
this reason, this factor arose recently in the context of judicial
confirmation proceedings for Judge Robert Bork.
The FederalistPapersallude to the importance of a judicial

selection process that is unencumbered by political considerations
and respectful of the independence of the third branch. 32 In the
11In the constitutional framework, the framers considered an independent third
branch "essential" to the operation of the new Republic. In FederalistNo. 78, later to
serve as Chief Justice Marshall's blueprint for Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803),
Alexander Hamilton stated that "[the Constitution]
can be preserved in practice no
other way than through the medium of the courts of justice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void." THE FEDERAST
No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) [hereinafter Tm FEDERALiST]. The
Judiciary's essential function would be to police the bounds set by the Constitution
against encroachment by the political branches.
This difficult task would demand an independent, nonpolitical institution with the
capacity to check the two political branches. The framers thus saw the "independence
of the judges" as "an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in
the society." Tan FDmtisT No. 78, at 470. The understated "ill humors" against
which the judiciary would be a "bulwark" was none other than "injury of
private
rights
by unjust and partial laws." Id.
The framers feared the consequences of an unchecked legislature. Only judges
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context of a recent confirmation, Senator Hatch of the Judiciary

Committee, who has himself been repeatedly mentioned as a
Supreme Court candidate, stated in more direct terms the potential implications of ideological inquiries for the independence of
the judiciaryFederal judges are not politicians and ought not be judged like
When we undertake to judge a judge according
politicians.
to political, rather than legal criteria, we have stripped the

independent of political partialities and pressures would be able to ensure that the
"power of the people," as expressed in the Constitution, would remain "superior" to
the will of the political branches. Id. This basic concept-that the will of the people is
most evident in the Constitution-later was the foundation of Hamilton's masterful
defense of an independent judiciary in the face of anti-majoritanan charges that Article
III conflicts with democratic rule.
The creation of an unprecedented nonpolitical judiciary presented a profound
challenge to the framers. On the one hand, the institution had to be sufficiently sensitive
to political controversy to settle constitutional disputes between the political branches
and sufficiently compatible with democratic principles to satisfy the ratifying states. On
the other hand, the institution had to remain sufficiently distant and distinct from the
political branches to prevent pollution of the judicial function. Once again, Hamilton
described the consequences of abandomng the distinctions of the independent judicial
function: "liberty can have noting to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have
mhe judiciary
everyting to fear from its umon with either of the other departments
influenced by its co-ordinate branches." Id.
is in continual jeopardy of being
at 466.
The framers considered some interbranch conflict inevitable, and to a limited
degree, desirable, to preclude any single branch from acquinng sufficient power to
subjugate human rights. Thus, the judicial branch would inevitably become involved in
political disputes. The only way courts could successfully arbitrate and settle those
disputes would be as an independent, nonpolitical rekeree on the basis of legal principles
in the Constitution. The danger, however, was that the judicial branch would be
pressured to enter the political fray.
To enable the judicial branch to enforce the "manifest tenor of the Constitution"
in essentially political disputes while retaining its umque nonpolitical independence, the
framers employed some unique institutional devices. Hamilton, while discussing the
distinct character of the third branch, identified the mechamsms to preserve its independence: "The manner of constituting [the judiciary] seems to embrace these several
objects: First, the mode of appointing the judges. Second, the tenure by which they are
to hold their places." Id. at 464. From the very outset, the framers sensed that the
manner of Supreme Court appointment and life tenure for judges were linked to the
independence of the federal judiciary.
Life tenure and the diminution of salaries clauses insulate the judicial branch from
any unseemly pressure from the political branches. Similarly, the Constitution's judicial
selection process was designed to find individuals "who unite the requisite integrity with
the requisite knowledge" in a manner that enhances the independence, integrity, and
institutional individuality of the judicial branch. Id. at 471.
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judicial office of all that makes it a distinct separated power.
If the general public begins to measure judges by a political
yardstick, and if the judges themselves begin to base their
decisions on politics, we will have lost the reasoning processes
of the law which have served so well to check political fervor
over the past 200 years. I would ask Americans if they would
Wish to have their life, liberty, and property resting on the
decision of judges who are primarily worried about tomorrow's
newspaper headlines or what might be said in some future
This is a new threat to the indenomination proceeding.
pendence and integrity of the Federal judiciary 31
In accord with these words of warning, the history of the drafting of the Constitution and the Senate's prior confirmation
proceedings suggest that when the Senate undertakes detailed
review of judicial philosophy, the independence of the judiciary
becomes an important factor counseling adoption of some restraint on the character of the inquiry

IV

THE CONSTrrUnON's LANGUAGE

Because the Constitution sets- forth no explicit standards for
advice and consent decisions, the Senate decides for itself when
to undertake review of a nominee's judicial philosophy, whether
to set or abidd by any limitations in the review, and the point
at which the independence of the judiciary counsels restraint.
The Senate's deciSions on these central questions will certainly
influence every confirmation proceeding and in many instances
may be dispositive of the outcome.
Therefore, the Senate has not only an obligation to examine
the history of the drafting of the Constitution but also its own

precedents. Such examination is necessary in order to set an
dffective standard for application of its advice and consent authority Which, as far as possible in a political institution, is
applied equally to candidates of different presidents and of
different judicial philosophies. Nominees and presidents ought
to be able to ascertain the confirmation standards to be employed from one confirmation to the next. In this context, the

" 133 CONG. REc. S14,i81 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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history of the Constitution and past Senate confirmation practice
provide some clear guidelines.
Article II, section 2, of the Constitution states that the
President "shall nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Judges of the Supreme
Court. '3 4 Although this language provides no express guidelines
for employment of the Senate's advice and consent function,
the debates that produced this language suggest some general
prudential limits. Nonetheless, many scholars have seized on
some details of the drafting of this clause, such as the lateness
of the emergence of the final language, to conclude "the very
reverse of the idea that the Senate is to have a confined role. ' 35
A closer review of the history of this language, however, suggests
that the Framers envisioned some restraints on the process.
The final language of the appointments clause was the result
of relatively extensive consideration in the context of the brief
Philadelphia summer that produced the Constitution. The Virgima plan-Madison's blueprint from which the Convention
worked to draft the Constitution-initially proposed that "a
National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more
supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the

National Legislature.'

'36

Relatively early in the Convention, on June 5, this clause
became the subject of debate. James Wilson of Pennsylvania
opened the discussion by opposing the appointment of judges
by the legislature. He asserted that "experience shewed the inpropriety of such appointments by numerous bodies. Intrigue,
partiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences. ' 37
As an alternative, Wilson suggested that "a principal reason for
unity in the Executive was that officers might be appointed by
a single, responsible person. ' 38 In light of subsequent history, it
is iromc that it was South Carolina's John Rutledge who arose

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
35 Black, supra note 20, at 661 (Stating that because the wording was changed
'4

only at the last mnute, some thought that the Legislative role was still largely intact.);
Rees, supra note 4, at 937; see also Ross, supra note 4, at 68a.
1 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
[hereinafter Farrand].
11 1 Farrand at 119.
39 Id.
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to oppose giving the appointment power "to any single person." 3 9 John Rutledge later became the first Supreme Court
nominee ever to be rejected by the Senate. 40
Perhaps sensing a divisive friction in the air, Doctor Benjanun Franklin arose to relieve the tension with humor. He noted
that two modes of appointment had been mentioned, but he
"wished such other modes to be suggested. ' 41 Then in a "brief
and entertaining manner," as described by Madison, Dr. Franklin "related a Scotch mode." 42 This consisted of the "nomination proceed[ing] from the Lawyers, who always selected the
ablest of the profession in order to get rid of him, and share
his practice [amongst themselves].' ' 4 Although clearly intended
to be humorous, Franklin's wit does serve to reveal that the
Convention placed a high premium on one of the functions of
the advice and consent proceeding, namely assessment of qualifications. No doubt the framers sought an appointment mecha44
msm which would produce the "ablest of the profession."
With laughter still ringing in the State House, Virginia's
James Madison must have sensed an opportunity to achieve
another of his many masterful compromses. James Madison
first tried to establish his claim to the middle ground. He, like
Wilson, "disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature"
and, like Rutledge, he was "not satisfied with referring the
appointment to the Executive. ' 45 Indeed, Madison maintained,
"[h]e rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial .branch.
He
hinted this only "4 Apparently sensing that the Convention,
however, was not ready to reach any conclusion on this important issue, the crafty Virginia delegate finished his address with
a motion to strike "appointment by the Legislature" from the
Virginia plan which he had drafted. 47 Wilson, perhaps feeling he
39Id.
40 See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text; Appendix chart.
41 1 Farrand at 120.
4' Id.
43 Id.

" Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. The specific reference in Madison's record to the point that he had merely
"hinted" at tis stage of the proceedings calls to mind that Madison revised his record
many decades after the actual events.
47

Id.
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had prevailed, seconded the motion, which carried 9 states to
2.48 This left the mode of appointment for Supreme Court
"judges" unspecified.
At this early juncture, the Convention had deterrmned not
to vest appointment in the legislature. Madison's reasons against

legislative appintment were apparently persuasive: "Mr. Madison disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature or
any numerous body, Besides, the danger of intrigue and partiality, many of the members [of the legislature] were not judges
of the requisite qUalif'ications. The Legislative talents which were
very different from those of a Judge, commonly recommended
' 49
men to the favor bf Legislative Assemblies.
Madison pointedly noted the distinction betweeni lawmaking
and judging: "[lgisiative talents
[are] very different from
tfiose of a Judge."S This was an explicit reference in the record
of the Convention to the distinction between judges and political
officers. Madison and Wilson, at least, seerhed resolved that the
selection of the nonpolitical officers of the judicial branch should
not fall prey to the intrigues and partialities of the political
process. Moreover, Madison clearly informed the Convention
that the means of selecting judges could affect the institutional
character. of the third branch. Madison was destined to struggle
for some time to find the best institutional means to select judges
possessing legal, rather than lawmaking, qualifications. In any
event, it is hard to etcape the conclusion that Madison wished
to divorce the politics of lawmaking from the process of selecting
legal officia1g.
In any event, on the seventh day of debate in 1787, June 5,
the Convention had already delineated the parameters of the
appointments isue. Due to fears of partisan intrigue and legislative predispositionis to favor lawmaking over legal skills, the
delegates decided that judges would not be selected by the legislature as a whole. On the other hand, the delegates also were
not prepared to 6ntrust so important a funct1dn to a single chief
exdcutive. The Convention would consider many other formu-

43 Id.
49

Id.

soId.
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lations before arriving in July at the formulation that ultimately
prevailed.
With no process for appointment specified, Delegates Pinckney and Sherman were free to attempt a restoration of the
appointment-by-the-legislature concept on June 13.51 Madison
objected:
[the legislature would be an] incompetent judgen of the reqpartiali, too much influenced by
uisite qualifications
displayed a talent for business In
ties. The candidate who
or used other winning means, would
the legislative field
without any of the essential qualificatiQns for an expositor of
possessed of eyery
the 'aw prevail over- a competitor
necessary accomplishment.5 2
Once again, Madison emphasized at lpngth the distinction between the branches as his reason for opposing appointment by
Congress. As an alternative to the Pinckney-Sherman plan, Ma53
dison suggested that the Senate be given the appointment power.
Perhaps trusting that the Senate would not be siubject to political
Madison's suggestion on June 13
whims, the delegates accepted
54
vote,
recorded
a
without
The issue was far from decided at that point. On June 15,
Delegate William Patterson of New Jersey put forth a new
blueprint for the Constitution in an effort to secure more advantages for the smaller states. The New Jersey plan suggested
that judges should be appointed solely by the Exqcutive. 55 ApT
parently the smaller states feared that in a Senate and House
where representation was based 9n population, their opportunity
to influence the judicial selection process would be best protected
by the Chief Executive. On June 18, Alexander Hamilton delivered a lengthy address on the need for a strong executive in
which he advocated that key offiqers, including judges, should
be appointed by the Executive "subject to the apprqbation or
rejection of the Senate, ' 56s Thus, although the Conventlon hgd
11 Id. at 232.
S2 Id. at 232-33.
53 Id.
Id. P~t233.
5,Id. at

244.

m Id. at 292.
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tentatively given the Senate appointment authority, executive
appointment continued to win support from some states and
delegates. Alexander Hamilton was apparently the first delegate
to suggest vesting the appointment power in the Executive with
the Senate serving a checking function.
When the question arose before the delegates again on July
18, Massachusetts' Delegate Gorham opined that the Senate was
"too numerous, and too little personally responsible, to ensure
a good choice." '5 7 Perhaps encouraged by Hamilton's earlier
recommendation, he proposed instead appointment by the Executive with the advice and consent of the Senate as was specified
in the Constitution of Massachusetts. 8
The debate at that juncture became very involved. James
Wilson preferred that the Executive make appointments without
Senate participation, but would accept Gorham's formulation.5 9
Delegates Martin, Bedford, and Sherman preferred that the Senate make appointments without Executive branch participation. 60
Maryland's Martin contended that the Senate "being taken from
all the States
would be best informed of characters and
most capable of making a fit choice. ' 61 Gorham responded
sharply that if Senators cannot "get the man of the particular
State to which they may respectively belong, they will be indifferent to the rest." 62 Moreover, he feared "intrigue and cabal"
in senatorial appointment. 63
Delegates Mason and Morris interrupted to discuss the impropriety of judges presiding over the impeachment of the Executive who appointed them. James Madison, ever the conciliator,
made another suggestion: "Judges might be appointed by the
Executives with the concurrence of one-third at least of the
Senate." 64 On this occasion, however, Madison's suggestion was
passed over without direct comment. Delegate Sherman instead

." 2 Farrand at 41.

58Id.
59Id.
6

Id.

61Id. at 41.
6-

Id. at 42.

63 Id.

6 Id.
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responded to Gorham, charging that the executive would also
65
be vulnerable to intrigue.
Although Delegate Gorham's views were destined to prevail,
they suffered a temporary set-back on this particular day Nonetheless, because his views eventually prevailed, they deserve special attention. Delegate Gorham's response to the argument that
the Senate would be exposed to more qualified candidates was
that "the Executive
will be careful to look through all the
States for proper characters. Rhode Island is a full illustration
of the insensibility to character produced by a participation of
numbers, in dishonorable measures, and of the length to which
a public body may carry wickedness and cabal. ' 66
After this rather lengthy debate by 1787 Convention standards, two votes were taken. Wilson's motion to have the President alone make appointments failed, two states to six. 67
Gorham's motion for Executive nomination with Senatorial advice and consent-the system in Massachusetts-failed on a tie
vote, four to four.68 A consensus was beginning to form around
a compromise that would address Gorham's apprehensions about
the potential difficulties of a Senatorial appointment system.
Madison followed the tie vote on the Gorham motion with
another motion for an advice and consent plan permitting the
Senate to override the President's normnation by a two-thirds
vote. 69 The Convention decided unanimously to postpone the
issue. 70 This last action was an indication that the Convention
had turned the corner. Delegate Gorham had achieved only a
tie vote, but he had won the day The influential Madison was
now in his camp and the Convention had agreed to revisit the
issue. It was only a matter of time.
A brief discussion occurred again on August 23, when Delegate Morns-earlier an opponent of Executive appointmentargued against Senate appointment of judges, which was still in
the language of the draft document. 7' This was another sign that
61

Id. at 43.

"Id. at 42.
67 Id. at 44 (there was one abstention).
" Id. (there was one abstention).
6Id.
7O Id.

1,Id. at 389.
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the tide had shifted. The next consequential event occurred on
September 4 when the issue was assigned to the Special Committee on Postponed Matters, or the Committee of Eleven as it
was called in both the Official Journal and Madison's notes.
The September 4th report of that Committee contained the
current language of the Constitution.7 2
In the context of another debate, the delegates made their
views known on this new language. The Convention was discussing whether the Senate should be empowered to choose a
President in the event of a deadlocked Electoral CoUge. Commenting on the Electoral College provision, Delegate Wilson
expressed Ins concern that the plan would "throw
. a dangerous power into the hands of the Senate.1 7 3 He was specific
about the consequences of the Senate's new power;
They will have in fact, the appointment of the President, and
through Ins dependence on them, the virtual appointment to
offices; among others the offices of the Judiciary Department
In allowing [the Senate] thus to make the Executive and
Judiciary appointments,
the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers ar all blended in one branch of the Government. 74
Delegate Wilson continued to harbor concerns abput Senatorial
participation in the judicial selection. Indeed later, when the
judicial appointment clause was debated, he restated his views
and opined that "[responsibility is in a manner destroyed by
such an agency of the Senate." '75 Delegate Pinckney also echoed
76
his views.
Delegate Morris, whose change in views had been publicly
articulated only a few days earlier, spoke in favor of the new
language: "the President was to nominate, there would be rer
sponsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be
security." '77 After this brief debate, the commttee language was
78
accepted unammousy.

7

"

Id. at 498.
Id. at 522.

- Id. at 522, 523.
Id. at 539.

7S

76

77

Id.
Id.

7s Id.
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Some commentators, focusing perhaps too much on this last
action, have characterized the appointments clause as an "eleventh hour compromise. ' 79 To the contrary, the Convention voted
twice on a similar plan on July 18. The first vote was a tie. The
second was a unanimous vote to postpone an advice and consent
formulation. Moreover, intervening events, like the speeches of
Patterson, Hamilton, and Morris, indicated a shift in favor of
the Gorham formulation which had earlier achieved a tie. The
clearest indication that this matter was settled by the Convention
well before the report of the Committee of Eleven is that the
Committee's recommendation was embraced without dissent.
In conclusion, it appears that the arguments of Madison and
Gorham prevailed. They had apprehensions about committing
the appointment power into the hands of a numerous body
Madison stressed the inadequacy of legislators as assessors of
legal, rather than lawmaking, skills. Madison and Gorham both
expressed apprehensions about the danger of political intrigue
and partiality in the nomination of nonpolitical officers. Perhaps
most important was their emphasis on finding a system that
would adequately screen judicial candidates for the "requisite
qualifications." Accordingly, the Gorham-Madison compromise
vested the nomination power solely in the President. At the same
time, delegates like Morris were attracted to the new formulation
because it provided a Senatorial checking power as "security"
against any intrigues in the Executive nomination process.
In the wake pf the debates, the ratification process provided
further commentary on the meaning of the appointments clause
and the practical workings the Framers expected under the new
Constitution. Alexander Hamilton defended the interaction between the branches incorporated into the judicial selection process:
But [the President's] nomination may be overruled: this it
certainly may, yet it can only be to make place for another

nomination by himself [the Executive].
[The Senate could
not be tempted by the preference they mght feel to another
to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure

" Biden, supra note 20; Ross, supra note 4, at 639.
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themselves that the person they might wish would be brought
forward by a nomination. s0
Hamilton explained further that the Senate would be reluctant
to negate a Presidential nomination because "their dissent might
cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected." 8 1 Accordingly, he opined that the Senate would generally confirm normnations unless there were "special and strong reasons for the

refusal."82
Perhaps in response to critics of the Constitution who feared
that the President would have too much power and the Senate's
role would be superfluous, Hamilton responded:
To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate?
It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism
in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to
popularity

83

Thus, Hamilton, who had imtiated the idea of giving both
political branches a role in the appointment function, embraced
a very narrow scope for the advice and consent power. The
Senate, when prompted by "special and strong" evidence, would
act to prevent nepotism, crass regional favoritism, or other
distortions of the nomination process likely to produce "unfit
84
characters."
Thus, the history of the Constitutional Convention offers
guidance to the Senate on the three questions posed by confirmation proceedings. With regard to the first question, under
what circumstances should the Senate delve into judicial ideology, this history contemplates that the Senate must serve an
appropriate checking function. The 1787 and ratification debates
focused primarily on creation of a system that would identify
the "ablest of the profession." Accordingly, the historical record
would encourage the Senate to place a particular emphasis on

0TH
" Id.
s2 Id.
" Id.
&4

Id.

FEDERALIST

No. 76, at 457 (A. Hamilton).
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assessment of the entire array of qualifications necessary for the
challenges of court decisionmaking. In this context, Madison's
repeated statements about selecting judges with judicial and legal
skills, as opposed to legislative and policy making skills, acquire
particular significance. As a normal rule, therefore, this history
suggests that the Senate should concentrate on qualifications.
By the same token, the Senate is expected to perform a
critical checking function. It is therefore consistent with this
history for the Senate to perceive that a President has evinced a
particular "favoritism" in selecting a candidate of a peculiar
judicial philosophy and for that perception to trigger an inquiry
into judicial views. Thus, the compromise position 5 on when an
ideological inquiry might be warranted finds considerable support in the debates accompanying the language of article II.
With regard to the scope of an inquiry into judicial philosophy, the eighteenth century debates evince general apprehensions about undue partisanship and political intrigue in the
appointment process. In this vein, the debates counsel the Senate
to deemphasize political factors in the confirmation process. To
the extent that the Senate has been or would be influenced to
reject a nominee solely to punish or warn the nomnating president or solely to guarantee that a particular state or region was
represented on the Court, for instance, the debates would counsel against such a course. Moreover, the emphasis on qualifications found in the debates counsel some self-restraint in the
scope of Senate inquiries into judicial philosophy
In sum, the language of the appointments clause clearly
distinguishes between the roles of the President, as nominator,
and the Senate, as advisor and consenter The debates that
created the clause indicate that the Framers committed the nomination power to the President with the Senate serving a sensitive
checking function. The authors of the Constitution anticipated
that the Senate would provide a "security" check on any predisposition of the President to nominate unfit judges. At the
same time, the debates rejected any role for political and partisan
intrigue in the nomination process. In particular, the debates
indicate the Framers' awareness that a flawed judicial selection

81See supra notes

15-16 and accompanying text.
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process could adversely affect the independence of the single
nonpolitical branch. Accordingly, the history of the appointments clause counsels the Senate to take great care in establishing
the scope and subject matter of confirmation inquiries.

V

THE

SENATE PRECEDENTS

Because the Senate itself will ultimately determine the standard of review to be applied in confirmation inquines, the
history of past confirmations provides some rules of practice for
the Senate. Several studies have substantiated the existence of
various factors contributing to the twenty-eight rejections in the
history of Supreme Court nominees. 86 Most legal commentators,
however, have interpreted these precedents as an indication that
the Senate has had "no doubt that inquiry into a candidate's
substantive views was a proper and even essential part of the
confirmation process.''87
A closer review of past Supreme Court confirmations reveal,
to the contrary, that probing inquiries into a candidate's views
were relatively infrequent. Moreover, where an examination of
a candidate's "substantive views" occurred, the inquiry was
generally unrelated to judicial philosophy. Instead, the inquiry
usually focused on another nonjudicial political issue of the day
in which the candidate had become embroiled. The type of
"substantive views" examined in past confirmation proceedings
lends very little support to the notion that the Senate has traditionally attempted to ascertain how a candidate's judicial philosophy might affect Supreme Court directions. In sum, the
Senate precedents for intense scrutiny of how a candidate might
influence Supreme Court jurisprudence are few in number and
recent in origin.
Of the twenty-eight rejected nominees, most were rejected
due to geographic favoritism, animosity toward the appointing

"H. ABaAnAm,supra note 3; L. TmE,supra note 3; C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
(1923) [hereinafter WARREN]; Biden, supra note 20,

CoURT INUNrrED STATES HISTORY

at S10,524-26; 133 CONG. REc. S10,878-85 (daily ed. July 30, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); Ross, supra note 4.
L. TRINE, supra note 3, at 80; Black, supra note 20; Rees, supra note 4; see
Ross, supra note 4.
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president, or a lack of qualifications. 88 The rejected confirmations often featured, but were not dominated by, questions about
a candidate's substantive views. As a general rule, the substantive
views examined, however, had little or nothing to do with the
policies of the Supreme Court. The record indicates that the
Senate as a collective body has, as a rule, exercised restraint in
weighing a candidate's judicial views as determinants of the
suitability of a nominee.
VI. 1795-1893
A brief examnnation of the twenty-one rejections in the Constitution's first century does not provide extensive evidence of a
Senate practice of giving the nomnnee's judicial philosophy a
role in the confirmation process. Blatant political considerations-such as the strength of the President's party in the Senate,
the President's lame duck status, and regional preferences in the
Senate-were far more influential than judicial philosophy in
the rejections of this era. At the outset, however, these twentyone rejections must be balanced by the recognition that during
this era sixty-seven justices were confirmed without undue political or ideological pressures.
In analyzing the rejections of this era, some evident patterns
emerge. Several rejections occurred in this century because the
nominee lacked the qualifications for the office. For instance,
President James Madison's second nomination suffered for lack
of qualifications. In the words of Professor Lawrence Tribe,
"Alexander Wolcott, a Connecticut boss of the Democratic Republican party, was the first nomnnee to be rejected primarily
because he was not up to snuff." 89 Another was George Williams, President Grant's Attorney General, who was attacked by
both the bar and the press as sadly mediocre.9 Stung by the
criticism, the nominee asked the President to withdraw his name.9 1

S See infra notes 89-215 and accompanying text.

L. TRIE, supra note 3, at 81; see also H. ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 41
(Abraham also notes opposition because of Wolcott's vigorous enforcement of the
embargo and nomntercourse acts.).
10H. ABRAHAm, supra note 3, at 46.
9,Id.
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Eleven of the twenty-one rejections during this era were
victims of overt partisan politics associated with the timing of
Supreme Court vacancies and presidential elections. Thus, the
Senate rejected these nominations to preserve the chance that a
President of the same political party as the majority of the
Senate would be elected and able to fill the vacant seat. The
rejected nominees' primary flaw was simply the party affiliation
92
of the nominating President.
In February of 1829, for instance, John Crittenden's nomination was "postponed" on a partisan vote. President Andrew
Jackson had already been elected to replace President John
Quincy Adams. 93 The Senate's vote foiled President Adams' lastminute attempt to fill the seat and preserved the vacancy for
President Andrew Jackson's appointment. 94 President John Tyler, the first unelected President, had five nomnations defeated
"chiefly because of the mistaken expectation of the Clay Whigs
that their revered leader would defeat James K. Polk in the
Presidential election of 1844." 91 The three rejections suffered by
President Fillmore were prompted by similar partisan strategems
near the end of the President's tenure. 96 In a familiar pattern,
lame duck President James Buchanan's 1860 nomination of Jeremiah Black failed by a single vote because only one month
remained in Buchanan's term and the Senate wished to preserve
97
the vacancy for newly-elected President Abraham Lincoln.
The high-water mark of this hostility toward a President
came in 1866 when the Congress eliminated the vacant seat on
the Supreme Court rather than allow President Andrew Johnson

See id. at 39-40.
93Id.
9 Id. at 40.
11Id. at 40 (Spencer was defeated 21-26; action was postponed on Reuben Walworth and John Read; Edward King was twice nominated and both times the Senate
took no action.).
9 Id. at 40. In 1852, the Senate voted to postpone consideration of George E.
Badger's nomination, even though he was then a Whig Senator from North Carolina,
and informally postponed William Micou's nomination in the last month of Fillmore
tenure. During the previous year, Fillmore's nomination of Edward Bradford expired
on the eve of a presidential election in which Fillmore was not a candidate. Again, these
defeats were engineered "to preserve court vacancies for incoming Democratic President
Franklin Pierce."
9 Id.
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to nominate his Attorney General, Henry Stanbery 98 Thus, eleven
of the twenty-one rejections in our first century had little, if

anything, to do with the ideology of the nominee. Rather, these
were partisan attempts to thwart a lame duck or unelected president.
This form of political infighting often blighted confirmations
in the Supreme Court's early hstory One commentator noted
that "[firom the Senate's rejection of Rutledge in 1795 to its
rejection of Parker in 1930, there were 94 nominations, but only
73 were made by Presidents who were neither lame ducks nor
were serving out the terms of their predecessors. Of these 73
nominations, the Senate rejected or forced the withdrawal of
only 8."99 On the other hand, .the majority of the twenty-one
nominations made by politically weak presidents were rejected.
A third category independent of judicial philosophy may be
characterized as another way of assessing the political strength
of the president. In these rejections, a strong Senator was able
to invoke senatorial courtesy to defeat a nomnnee. Henry Abraham notes that this "appears to have been the sole factor in
Grover Cleveland's unsuccessful nominations of William B.
Hornblower (1893) and Wheeler H. Peckham (1894)."1 00
In 1894, New York's powerful Democratic Senator David B.
Hill felt that President Cleveland should nominate another New
Yorker to replace Justice Samuel Blatchford. Accordingly, Senator Hill invoked senatorial courtesy and convinced his colleagues to narrowly defeat Hornblower, by a margin of 24-30,
and Peckham, by a margin of 32-41.101 President Cleveland,
however, outfoxed Senator Hill m the long run by nomnnating
Democratic Majority Leader Edward White of Louisiana to fill
the vacancy On that nomnation, the forces of senatorial cour2
tesy reversed gears and the President's nomination prevailed.'0
Similarly, Rueben Walworth, one of Tyler's nominees whose
fate was described above, was defeated primarily due to Sena-

"Id. at 40-41.
"Ross, supra note 4, at 644 n.61.
1wH. ABRaAm, supra note 3, at 27-28.
101Id. at 27-28.
,m Id.
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tonal courtesy 103 The Whigs, "thinking they had victory in their
grasp," postponed the Walworth nomination on a narrow 20-27
vote. 04 Finally, President James Polk's nomination of Pennsylvaman George Woodward ran afoul of Pennsylvania Senator
Simon Cameron, who invoked senatorial courtesy against one
of his own constituents. 0 5 Woodward's nomination failed on a
20-29 vote.'06
This narrows the list of twenty-one rejections down to five.
The rejected candidate's substantive views played a larger role
in these cases. In no case, however, were the views in question
related directly to judicial philosophy The earliest of these was
John Rutledge who was opposed by his fellow Federalists in the
Senate because he had ardently opposed one of their favorite
projects-the Treaty achieved by Chief Justice John Jay in
1794.107 The Jay Treaty was a heated public issue in 1795 when
President Washington appointed Rutledge to succeed Jay who
was retiring to become Governor of New York. Rutledge's credentials seemed unassailable: delegate to the 1787 Convention,
former Governor of South Carolina, and former Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, the Jay Treaty dominated political affairs of
this period. Many American merchants, particularly m the South,
were disappointed by a treaty that permitted the defeated British
to recover pre-war debts, but denied reimbursement for Amencan property carried off during the conflict.108 Prior to his nomination, South Carolina's John Rutledge had joined the chorus
of Southern opponents. This ired the Federalists, who dominated
the Senate. After his nomination, Rutledge took his seat on a
recess appointment and began to serve as Chief Justice. 109 Meanwhile, the Northern Federalist newspapers began to denounce
him vigorously 110

103 Id.

104Id. at 105-06.
0I Id. at 41-42.
'0

Id.

-° Id. at 65.

1011 WARREN, supra note 86, at 129.
109Id. at 133.
110Id. at 129-31.
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At the same time, another serious allegation arose against
Rutledge. As early as August 4, 1795, Attorney General Bradford had written to Alexander Hamilton suggesting that Rutledge
was displaying signs of derangement and had attempted sicide."' Alexander Hamilton, in turn, wrote to Senator Rufus
King of New York suggesting "if the charges [of derangement]
112
are true," that he w6uld advise a vote against the nomnation.
As these charges became notorious, the press began to attack
Rutledge's behavior, accusing him of failure to pay debts among
other niproprieties."' Perhaps out of deference to the former
Justice and venerable delegate to the 1787 Convention, the Senate debate on the nomination concentrated on the treaty issue.
Charles Warren opines that "the excited political situation"
spelled defeat for Rutledge "irrespective of [his] mental condition." 11 4 The Senate's fitness concerns, however, proved Well
founded as Rutledge's mental condition deteriorated markedly
during the time pnor to his death five years later.
In this case, an unacceptable judicial philosophy was not the
flaw which cost Rutledge the Chief Justiceship. Rutledge was an
avowed Federalist. He had signed the Constitution, worked for
its ratification, and ultimately was confirmed as one of President
Washington's charter members of the Supreme Court. His judicial philosophy was well-known and undoubtedly shared by
the predominantly Federalist Senate. Rutledge's faults in the eyes
of the Senate related to Ins views on an issue entirely utirelated
to judicial decisionmaking. His views on the treaty issue were
scrutinized not because they were likely to affect his perforrhance
on the Supreme Court, but because they offended the Senate
and rendered him unfit for any confirmable position. The vortex
of the concern over Rutledge was his indiscreet statements add
behavior on past political issues, not a concern over how he
might decide cases as a Supreme Court justice. Accordingly, the
Rutledge nomination should not be cited for the proposition that
the Senate has in the past engaged in judicial philosophy inquiries.

22

ld. at 137,
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
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Next came Roger B. Taney, who was opposed largely because
of President Andrew Jackson's anti-bank policies that Treasury
Secretary Taney carried out. In his opposition to the National
Bank, President Jackson had ordered Taney's predecessor as
Treasury Secretary, Louis McLane, to withdraw all the Government's deposits from the bank. McLane refused, but Taney
complied, thus simultaneously winning the admiration of the
15
President and the contempt of the Whigs in the Senate.
In 1835, President Jackson sent Taney's nomination to the
Senate for the position of Associate Justice. 116 The Senate "postponed" the Taney nomnnation on its last day in session and
simultaneously passed a bill to eliminate the seat on the Court.
The court-depacking bill failed in the House, and John Marshall
7
passed away in the interim."
Thus, President Jackson nominated Taney on December 28
to be Chief Justice."1 This prompted heated confrontations in
the Senate. Whig Senator Henry Clay led the opposition. In the
words of one Senator, "[tihere was.hardly an opprobrious epithet which, as he told me himself, afterwards, Clay failed to use
against the nomination." 11 9 The Whig press editorialized against
the nomination exclaiming that "[t]he pure ermine of the Supreme Court is sullied by the appointment of that political hack,
Roger B. Taney 120 Nonetheless, Taney won confirmation by
the margin of 29-15. Ironically, Henry Clay later rued the folly
of his opposition when he told the Chief Justice years later, "I
am satisfied now that no man in the United States could have
been selected more abundantly able to wear the ermine which
Chief Justice Marshall honored."'' This is an indication that
Senators are scarcely better than presidents at predicting how

-' H.C. HocKsca,
1876, 86 (1939).
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past political performance will translate into judicial performance.
Like Rutledge, Taney faced opposition not on the basis of
how he might decide future cases but on the basis of how he
had conducted himself during current political controversies. The
Whigs resented Taney's receipt of a reward for opposing their
policies. Their effort was focused far less on his judicial philosophy and any "damage" he might cause as a Supreme Court
Justice, than on an effort to punish him for supporting policies
unpopular in the Whig Senate. Accordingly, this example offers
little comfort to the modern apologists for in depth examination
of judicial philosophy. Rather, the Taney confirmation counsels
against politicizing the confirmation process.
In 1869, President Grant nominated his "eminently qualified
and popular" Attorney General, Ebenezer Hoar.'2 The main
issue against Hoar was his "consistent refusal to back Senatorial
nominations for judgeships [and] by his publicly uncompromising insistence on 'nonpolitical' appointments.'

''

With a Senate

accustomed to the corrupt patronage of the Reconstruction era,
this was not a popular position.'1 In addition, Hoar had angered
some Republican Senators by opposing the impeachment of Andrew Johnson.' 25 Once again, Ebenezer Hoar was rejected in
1870 as a result of his role in a contemporaneous political
confrontation, not as a result of his judicial philosophy and the
likelihood that he would hue to a particular line in deciding
cases.
The fatal blow to his candidacy, however, may well have
turned on geographical considerations. Regional considerations
were politically important when the Justices also "rode the circuits." Hoar, from Massachusetts, was appointed to a seat
assigned to a Southern circuit. The final vote was 24-34 against
Hoar. Professor Friedman points out that Hoar lost several votes
on the impeachment issue, but that the absence of votes from
Southern Republicans (who voted against him 13-3) cost him the

M"
H. ABRAHAm, supra note 3,
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nomnaton. 126 The geographical question apparently supplied the
margin of defeat.
Grant's nomination of Caleb Cushing was defeated on the
basis of a unique mix of ethical and political considerations.
Cushing's judicial philosophy was undoubtedly satisfactory to
the post-war Republican Senate. In fact, he had helped draft the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the Republican party's crowning achievement of that era. During the war, however,
Cushing allegedly objected to patriotic music and hoisted a rebel
flag on one of his ships. These allegations would not have been
fatal if a letter he had written to newly-elected Confederate
President Jefferson Davis had not come forth. This letter asked
l5 avis to arrange a meeting with one of Cushing's former law
clerks. In the post-war patriotic hysteria, Cushing could not
overcome allegations of disloyalty 127 This rejection, again, was
not primarily motivated by apprehensions over Cushing's judicial
philosophy Entanglement in the burning political question of
the day, however, apparently made his nomnnation a symbolic
test vote on matters wholly unrelated to judicial philosophy
Stanley Matthews was nominated by President Hayes, an
avowed one-term President, in 1881.12 Matthews was controversial because, as an attorney and Senator from Oino, he had
opposed a popular anti-railroad bill sponsored by the Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. In apparent retribution, the
Judiciary Committee failed to act on the nomination prior to
expiration of Hayes' term. President Garfield immediately renominated Matthews. 129 He was approved by the Senate on this
second try and served for seven years on the Court. 10
In any event, of the last five rejections, two were only
temporarily delayed in their confirmations as Justices, and the
cause of tlie other three was unrelated to the candidates' judicial
ideology. In each of those rejections, punishment for past political indiscretions was more evident than apprehension over a
prospective judicial record. The Senators were casting votes de-

126

Freidman, supra note 4, at 34.

'27

Id. at 24-25.

121

H. ABPaAm, supra note 3, at 135-36.

'29

Id.

130

Id.
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manded by the symbolic role played by the nominee in political
affairs. The historical record is rather convinclng evidence of a
Senate disposed to accept the guidelines of the 1787 Convention
and remain within a restrained concept of the advice and consent
function.
These rejections contain a caution of the dangers of politicizng the appointment process. As this brief survey discloses,
the decade of the Reconstruction featured the most prominent
cases of political domnation of the confirmation process. This
era featured other threats as well to the Court's independence.
During that period, political checks on the Court were not merely
brandished but actually employed. The number of seats on the
Court was reduced to prevent appointments. Nominations were
considered political patronage or were allocated according to
geography During the same time that selection of justices was
just another political question, the Court was occasionally treated
as just another political entity Congress even stripped the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear a case on which it had
already heard oral arguments.'0 The Court concomitantly lost
status as an independent institution with a nonpolitical constitutional nussion distinct from the policy-making and admimstrative branches. While Congress is not likely to engage in such
excesses again, this record is indicative of the blurring of functions that can occur when the branches deal confrontationally
with each other.
In any event, the era of 1795-1893 produces no support for
the notion that the Senate has traditionally engaged in scrutiny
of judicial philosophy When the Senate did, on a few occasions,
consider a nominee's substantive views, those considerations did
not pertain to judicial philosophy
VII.

1893-1988

Since 1893, only seven nominations have failed to win confirmation. 32 In other words, in nearly a century, fifty-four nom-

1, Ex Parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318 (1867) (wherein Congress removed the court's
power to grant writs of habeas corpus for cases in which the petitioner was charged
with a military offense and held in the custody of United States military authorities).
32 H. ABRAHA", supra note 3, at 386-91 (updated).
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inations have won confirmation without a central focus on
scrutiny of judicial philosophy In fact, thirty-seven of those
confirmations came by a unanimous vote. Another thirteen won
confirmation with fewer than twenty-five dissenting votes. Of
the remaining four confirmations, the high-water mark of opposition was thirty-three votes against Chief Justice Rehnquist
in 1986. For more than a century, the Senate has not, as a rule,
employed policy preferences as the determinative test for Supreme Court nominees.
This confirmation record is significhnt in another sense as
well. During this period of nearly a century, the Senate confirmed fifty-four justices from Presidents with widely divergent
political and judicial ideologies. 1 3 During much of this period,
the majority of the Senate and the President owed their alleglance to different political parties. Nonetheless, partisanship
and ideological differences did not alter the normal rule of
avoiding undue scrutiny of judicial philosophy.
Setting aside for a moment the Bork confirmation, an examination of the other six rejected nominees over this period
suggests that questions of ethics or qualifications were generally
the determinative factors in the confirmation decision. Judicial
philosophy began to play a role in-some rejections, although it
was generally not determinative.
The most recent unsuccessful nominee was Judge Douglas
Ginsburg of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Although some early press accounts had branded Judge Ginsburg
a "Borklet" in an attempt to load his candidacy with some of
the ideological baggage fatal to Judge Bork's aspirations, Judge
Ginsburg withdrew himself from consideration in the face of
allegations about his use of marijuana many years before the
nomination. The other issue which had arisen prior to the charges
of marijuana use concerned Judge Ginsburg's failure to recuse
himself while serving in the Department of Justice from making
some decisions which affected companies in which he had a

M,Two Cleveland nominees, one McKinley nominee, three Theodore Roosevelt
nominees, six Taft nominees, three Wilson nominees, four Harding nominees, one
Coolidge nominee, three Hoover nominees, nine Franklin Roosevelt nominees, four
Truman nominees, five Eisenhower nominees, two Kennedy nominees, two Johnson
nominees, four Nixon nominees, one Ford nominee, and four Reagan nominees.
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minor and peripheral stock interest. At a time when the nation's
war on illicit narcotics was continually a front-page political
issue, the short-lived Ginsburg nomination was doomd by questions of ethics, not judicial philosophy
Judge G. Harrold Carswell, a Nixon nominee, was rejected
primarily due to his mediocre legal qualificatiois. 13 4 Even his
primary Senate advocate, Senator Hruska of Nebraska, conceded
that "[e]ven if he is mediocre there are a lot of mediocre judges
and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representa"111
This faint praise damned the nominee far more
tion..
than any considerations of judicial philosophy Senator Ernest
Hollings of South Carolina, for instance, noted that Carswell
"was not qualified to carry Judge Haynsworth's law books."' 3
The Dean of Yale Law School, Louis H. Pollack, testified that
Carswell "presents more slender credentials" than any other
Supreme Court nominee in a century. 1 7 Ultimately twenty-two
law school deans opposed Carswell's nomination, which failed
on a 45-51 vote on April 8, 1970. Thirteen Senators from President Nixon's party voted against the nomnation. This rejection
was far more a result of weak qualifications than an incompatibility with the Senate's policy preferences in judicial matters.
The other rejected Nixon nominee was Judge Clement F
Haynsworth, Jr. Judge Haynsworth demonstrated during the
confirmation hearings a "patent insensitivity to some financial
and conflict-of-interest improprieties."' 13 8 Judge Haynsworth
purchased 1,000 shares of Brunswick Corporation stock in 1967
after he had voted in favor of the Corporation in a case but
before the decision was announced. 3 9 When questioned about
the apparent impropriety, the Judge stated that he "simply did
not recall the pending decision" when making the stock pur-

"' H. ABRAHm,supra note 3, at 46 ("[A]II fair-minded observers now agree
on [his] lack of qualifications.").
M Id. at 16; L. TRBE, supra note 3, at 82.

-' R. DwnE, SINCE 1945: PoLrIcs AND DIPLOmACY IN RECENT AMEIcAN HISTORY
171 (A. Knopf ed. 1985).
17 R. HAMus, DECISION (1971).
M'H. ABP.AHA, supra note 3, at 15.
"9 Senate Hearings on the Nomination of Clement Haynsworth, Jr. to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 11-12 (1969).
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chase. 40 Another ethical issue arose when Judge Haynsworth
was accused of casting a deciding judicial vote in favor of a
company that did business with a firm in which the Judge held
a one-seventh interest. 14' As one commentator noteol, "how could
the Senate confirm Haynsworth when it had played such an
admirable acivist-moralist role in causing Fortas's resignation?

' 142

A combination of bad timing in the wake of the Fortas

confirmation and ethical improprieties, far more than the existent differences with the Senate on judicial ideology, provided
the "margin of defeat.' 1 43 The nomination of Judge Haynsworth
failed on a 45-55 vote on November 21, 1969
President Lyndon Johnson's nominee, Justice Abe Fortas,
tO succeed Chief Justice Earl Warren was questioned scrupulously for ethical improprieties, specifically, cronyism due to his
close relationship with the President, judicial impropriety due to
extrajudicial service as a close counsellor to the President during
his tenure ori the Supreme Court, and acceptance of exorbitant
lecture fees. 44 Justice Fortas testified that he had assisted the
President in planning Vietnam war strategies and responses to
urban riots. 45 Further, he was accused of attempts to get federal
government jobs for his friends. 46
A blatant political factor also influenced the outcome of the
Fortas nomination. President Johnson had already announced
that he would not seek Ins party's nomination to serve another
term as President. 47 With the Vietnam War raging and civil
unrest prevalent in many urban centers, President Johnson's
political strerngth was ebbing. Consequently, the President's
weakness magnified the ethical questions about Fortas' nomination.141

at 11.
Id. at 6-8.
142 H. ABRAnAm, supra note 3, at 5.
141 Id. at 43.
I- Id.
141

I"Hearings on the Nomination of Justice Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4150 (1965).
145

Id.

146Id.
147H.

14 Id.

ABAH,

supra note 3, at 41.
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At the same time, Fortas was under attack as a symbol of
the progressive jurisprudence of the Warren Court era.1 49 In
particular, Senator Thurmond of South Carolina attacked Justice
Fortas quite openly for his views on several important Supreme
Court decisions.' 50 The Senator questioned Fortas' posture on
2, 1968, the President
crimnal justice questions.' 5 ' On October
52
withdrew Justice Fortas' nomination.
Shortly thereafter, revelations of inappropriate paid legal
association with a coqvicted stock manipulator, Louis Wolfson,
led to Justice Fortas' resignation from the bench. 53 Although a
vocal minority of the Senate scrutinized Fortas' judicial ideology
closely, ethical and political questions plagued his candidacy as
well. In the wamng days of the Johnson Adminstration, these
various factors conspired to cause Fortas' withdrawal.
Judge Homer Thornberry lost his chance for a Supreme
Court seat when the Fortas nomlnation failed, leaving no vacancy for him to fill. One commentator has described Judge
Thornberry as a friend of President Johnson from Texas, "whose
record in Congress and on the federal bench was less outstanding
15 4
than was his personal devotion to the President.'
In addition to the Bork nomination, judicial philosophy of
the nominee was undoubtedly the central cause of rejection in
one other confirmation proceeding of this era. In 1930, President
Herbert Hoover nominated Judge John J Parker to replace
Justice Sanford who had died.'5 5 In a time of heated concern
over labor issues, Judge Parker was accused of insensitivity to
labor because he affirmed a lower court opinion upholding
yellow-dog contracts.5 6 In April 1927, Judge Parker followed a
1917 Supreme Court precedent by upholding a district court
injunction against interference in mine operations by the United
Mine Workers Union. According to Henry Abraham, Judge
Parker's questioned opinion indicated "neither approval or dis-

'49

Id. at 43-45.

Id.
is Id.
"5

13

Id.
Id.

114

Ross, supra note 4, at 654.

152

M"H. ABRA
I' Id. at 42.

m,

supra note 3, at 42-43.
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approval of yellow-dog contracts. ' 15 7 In fact, Judge Parker had
only upheld Supreme Court precedent, as he was bound to do
as a lower court judge. 158 Nonetheless, the President of the
American Federation of Labor testified against Judge Parker's
nomnnation because "[clonfirmation will mean another 'injunction' judge will be a member of the Supreme Court."' 59
The other issue against Judge Parker was a racist statement
made as a gubernatorial candidate ten years prior to his normnation. 160 On this subject, the Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Walter White,
testified against Judge Parker.' 6 In the face of this opposition,
Judge Parker was defeated 39-41 on May 7, 1930. Henry Abraham described Judge Parker's continued service on the Fourth
Circuit in these terms:
Ironically it would be Judge Parker
who would write some
of the earliest and most significant pro-black opinions on
desegregation. Among them were Rice v Elmore in 1947, in
which he sustained U.S. District Court Judge J.W Wanngs
outlawing of South Carolina's machinations to bar blacks from
primary elections, and his 1955 remand opinion in Briggs v
Elliott, in which he rejected "massive resistance."' 162
In the judgment of Henry Abraham, the ideological inquiry that
took place failed to accurately discern or predict the nomnee's
subsequent judicial performance on the Fourth Circuit. 63
In any event, the record of Senate confirmations from 18931988 is not replete with ideological inquisitions. Once again, the
general rule was to avoid questions about the nomnee's judicial

Id. at 42-43.
Id.
"' Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, United
States Senate, on the Confirmation of John J. Parker, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1930)
(testimony of William Green, President, Amencan Federation of Labor).
160Id. at 10 (When a candidate for governor of North Carolina in 1920, Parker
was quoted as saying that "[w]e recognize that [the black] has not yet reached the stage
in his development when he can share the burden and responsibilities of government.").
Id. at 74-79.
2 H. ABRAHAm, supra note 3, at 43; see Pier v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (1947),
sustained 72 F Supp. 516 (1947); see also Bnggs v. Elliot, 132 F Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C.
1955).
163 Id.
17

"5
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ideology While investigations of judicial philosophy played a
role in a few confirmation proceedings, most notably the Fortas
and Parker hearings, the Senate as a body exercised restraint in
nearly all confirmation inquiries.
VIII.

THE

BORK NOMIATION

AND THE MODERN ERA

As illustrated in this brief study of rejected nominees, a
candidate's substantive views on any topic only infrequently
emerged as a factor in unsuccessful nominations. Moreover,
where substantive views were examined, the inquiry was most
often confined to retrospective investigations of a candidate's
involvement in major public political issues or activities. Specific
examination of judicial philosophy with a prospective apprehension about a candidate's likely Supreme Court voting record was
very rarely a feature of these rejections. The examination of
judicial philosophy has a much shorter history Nonetheless, the
emergence of this factor, which became explicit in the Bork
proceedings, traces its roots to some earlier confirmations.
The first intimations of a change in the historical pattern of
confirmation proceedings came with the confirmation of Justice
Louis D Brandeis in 1916. Shortly after President Wilson announced the nomination, protests were heard from sixty-one
prominent citizens-many of them leading lawyers in Bostonmaintaimng that the nominee lacked the confidence of the bar
and was not fit for the position. 164 Six former presidents of the
American Bar Association also informed the Senate Judiciary
Committee that, in their opimon, Brandeis was "not a fit person
'
to be a member of the Supreme Court of the United States." 165
This stir was not caused by Brandeis' legal qualifications.
Harvard's Roscoe Pound prophetically testified that "so far as
sheer legal ability is concerned, [Brandeis] will rank with the
best who have sat upon the bench of the Supreme Court."' 166
The real underlying issue was a deep-seated prospective appre164Hearings on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to be Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., Ist Sess.
319 (1916).
6I Id. at 1226.
,6 Id. at vol. 2, p. 251.
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hension about Brandeis' judicial methodology and philosophy 167
Still, this apprehension was cloaked not in terms of dissatisfaction with judicial ideology, but in terms of vague questions about
judicial temperament and professional ethics.
The Senate apparently perceived the inadequacy and stealth
of the case against Brandeis. On June 1, 1916, he was confirmed
on a 47-22 vote. 68 The Senate declined to extend its inquiry to
exanune apprehensions about how Brandeis might decide cases
as a Justice.
Although apprehensions about judicial philosophy occasionally surfaced again after the Brandeis nomination, they played
no significant role again until the Parker nomination. As discussed, this exception to the historical rule of Senate restraint
was an instance where the Senate rejected a nominee because it
disagreed with the substantive results it expected Judge Parker
169
to render if confirmed.
The next instance of philosophical scrutiny was the second
Fortas nomination in 1968. As mentioned earlier, Justice Fortas'
candidacy for Chief Justice was marred by charges of overstepping the bounds of the judicial office and ethical insensitivity 170
When Justice Fortas appeared before the Senate Judiciary Comrmttee for questiomng, he was viewed by some Senators as a
"symbol of the pent-up frustrations against the Warren Courtbut against the Court as a unit rather than against the individuals.' 171 Several Senators questioned Fortas at length on his
judicial philosophy Still the Senate did not expand its standard
for ideological inquiries to include the likely outcome of future
rulings by Fortas. The questions about this aspect of Fortas'
record, however, contributed to the controversy associated with
ins nomnnation and delayed the proceedings until the ethical
charges began to poison the prospects for confirmation.
Similarly, Haynsworth's nomination was burdened by senatorial concerns about his judicial philosophy Although this nomination also failed on ethical grounds, the delays and controversy

167

Id.

168

Id.

See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
,71See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
171H. ABRAHA, supra note 3, at 44.
"'
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associated with the Judge's judicial philosophy provided the time
and environment which made the ethical charges fatal. 72 President Nixon's other nommees-in particular William Rehnquistencountered some friction due to questions of judicial philosophy,173 but still the Senate would not venture to abandon its
historical tradition of respecting the independent judicial function by refusing to demand that a candidate hue to any particular
ideological orthodoxy
Another step toward a wholesale dive into the depth of
philosophy inquiries occurred in the nomination of Sandra Day
O'Connor. President Reagan had recently swept into office on
the Republican platform which promised selection of judges
respectful of unborn human life.174 This was an explicit reference
to the Supreme Court's Roe v Wade17s decision which had
become controversial in many political sectors. When Arizona
state Judge O'Connor was nomnated, reports immediately surfaced about her votes as an Arizona legislator in favor of some
abortion policies.17 6 Some Republican Senators, emboldened by
acquiring majority status in the Senate, determined to inquire
about Judge O'Connor's judicial philosophy relative to doctrines
associated with Roe. Memoranda circulated among Republican
Senators and staff arguing for aggressive questiomng on this

aspect of judicial philosophy

177

When Judge O'Connor appeared before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, her questioners were very restrained and respectful.
For the most part, however, Judge O'Connor declined to divulge
her own particular judicial philosophy preferring instead to respond to questions by stating the current status of the law 178
When pressed on her personal judicial ideology, she maintained
" Id. at 43.

Il Id. at 22.
114The 1980 Republican platform plank stated: "We will work for the appointment
of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the
sadfetity of innocent human life." N.Y. Times, July 13, 1980, at 14, col. 2.
175410 U.S. 113 (1973).
276 Hearingson the Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor to be Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) [hereinafter Hearings on O'Connor].
I77This memorandum was revised and printed in Georgia Law Review in 1983,

Rees, supra note 4.
"I Hearingson O'Connor, supra note 176, at 69-70, 85, 130-31.
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that the judicial office requires her to avoid prejudging any
issue.179 A few Republican Senators expressed frustration at their
inability to get a clear picture of Judge O'Connor's philosophy
A counsel on the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee during
the hearings, who was desirous of more penetrating questions,
commented that: "Justice O'Connor apparently made no distinction between prejudging a case and forming an abstract
opinion on an issue before it has presented itself in a case."' 8 0
Justice O'Connor was unanimously approved. 81 The Senate once
again rejected invitations by a minority of Senators to expand
the limits of inquiries into judicial philosophy.
The next nomination to stir concerns in terms of judicial
philosophy was President Reagan's elevation of Associate Justice
Rehnquist to Chief Justice in the wake of Warren Burger's
retirement. Justice Rehnquist encountered a firestorm of opposition. The Senate Judiciary Committee engaged in an exhaustive
study of the allegations against Justice Rehnquist, including
allegations that his judicial philosophy was "out of the mainstream. 182 The scope of the Senate's inquiry was unfettered. As
an indication of the Justice's judicial philosophy, memoranda
that Justice Rehnquist had written thirty years earlier as a law
clerk to Justice Robert Jackson were dissected in exhaustive
questioning.8 3 In addition, some witnesses charged Rehnquist
with unethical behavior in refusing to recuse himself from the
decision of a case with which he had some peripheral dealings
as an Assistant Attorney General. 1 4 The Committee devoted an
entire day to investigating charges that Rehnquist had intimidated voters at an Arizona precinct during an election dispute
years before.' Finally, even the Justice's health was scrutinized.8 6 Despite the vitriol evinced by the campaign against the
nomination-which prompted one Senator to note that Rehnquist's opponents had conducted a "Rehnquisition" which left

-9Id. at 68,
1
"
183

120-21, 132-35.
Rees, supra note 4, at 951 (emphasis in onginal).
See id. at 922 n.37.
Hearings on Justice Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 15, 17.
Id. at 136-38, 161-62, 223, 300-01.

,84Id. at 182-85, 231-32, 265.
" Id. at 984-1135.
1' See supra note 5.
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"no stone unthrown" 187-the Senate confirmed the nomination.
The Senate as a whole was not persuaded to evaluate the nomination on the basis of the nominee's likely influence on directions of Supreme Court policy
The Rehnquist hearing set the stage for the nomination of
Judge Bork. The intensity of the ideological inquisition of Judge
Bork was unprecedented. While many prior confirmation proceedings had included an element of inquiry into substantive
views, the Bork nominatron ventured into unchartered territory
with respect to such investigations. The unprecedented aspects
of the scrutiny of Judge Bork's judicial philosophy include: first,
the abandonment of most self-imposed restraints on the nature
and purpose of the inquiries; second, the expansion in terms of
length and repetitiveness of the inquiry process; and third, an
element out of the control of the Senate but influenced by the
nature of the Senate proceedings, the use of direct political grassroots campaigmng and mass media advertising to shape public
opinmon on the nomination and affect the outcome.
Although former proceedings had examined a candidate's
substantive views, and occasionally even a candidate's substantive judicial views, the Bork proceeding, for the first time,
assumed characteristics of an express effort to affect the outcomes of Supreme Court decisions by rejecting an individual
with judicial views different from the majority of the Senate.
Former ideological inquiries had traditionally focused retrospectively on a past records to ascertain if a nominee possessed the
judgment or temperament for the significant responsibilities of
Justice. The Fortas proceeding had contained overtones of apprehension about the Justice's continued influence on the directions of Court policy Because Fortas was already an Associate
Justice, however, these overtones did not ripen into stated reservations about his future voting patterns. Instead, Fortas was
attacked by some Senate conservatives as a symbol for "pentup frustrations against the Warren Court.' '1 8 More importantly,
the Senate as a body did not engage in the questioning of Fortas
with an eye to influencing Supreme Court decisions via the

"
'u

132 CoNo. REc. S12,762 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
H. ABRAHnm, supra note 3, at 44.
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confirmation process. The inquiry was conducted by a distinct
minority of the Senate.
In the Bork proceeding, however, the Senate assumed the
role of considering prospectively the influence that the nominee,
if confirmed, might have on the substance of Supreme Court
judicial policy On the day that the nomination was announced,
the influential Senator Kennedy addressed the Senate to express
his apprehensions that "Robert Bork's America" would feature
resegregation, retrenchment of women's rights, reductions in free
speech, and so forth through a lengthy catalogue of current
social issues which the candidate would presumably affect if
confirmed.1 89 The Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman couched
the notion of considering the influence of the nomination on
Supreme Court judicial directions in more careful terms. He
stated that the Senate has a duty to consider judicial ideology
aggressively when "the balance of the Court itself is at stake."''
The notion of preserving a perceived balance on the Court
was immediately attacked by other Senators: "If past Presidents
had striven to preserve the Court's ideological balance, the vile
separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v Ferguson would still be
the law of the land."' 9' Another Senator reported finding no
Senate precedent surrounding the confirmation of Supreme Court
candidates that "requires or even suggests anything about balance between liberals and conservatives when a new nominee is
presented."' 9 2 The findings of this Senator are supported by a
review of prior confirmations. 93 Still another Senator noted that
the Senate had declined to consider "balance" as recently as
1967 when President Johnson made his second nomnation, even
though "[iut was immediately clear to every one on both sides
of the aisle that Mr. Marshall would decidedly, decisively, and
extraordinarily shift the Court's philosophical balante toward a
194
more liberal position."'

89 133 CONG. Rnc. 59,188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy);

see also Hearings on Bork, supra note 28, at 23.
"9 Biden, supra note 15, at S10,528.
"1 133 CONG. REC. S10,541 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
392 133 CoNG. Ric. 510,539 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
191See infra at 27-28.
11,Humphrey, supra note 23, at S10,275.
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Ultimately, the Senate elected as a body to consider directly
what effect the Bork nomination might have on Supreme Court
directions. The record of the proceedings on the floor is replete
with apprehensions of what Judge Bork might do as Justice
Bork. 95 While impossible to judge precisely why individual Senators cast their vote for or against the nominee, it is possible to
conclude that the examination of Judge Bork's ideology for its
potential prospective impact on Supreme Court jurisprudence
pushed back the frontiers of ideological inquiry
In terms of the quality and quantity of the inquiry, the Bork
proceedings also pushed back the former limits. As a procedural
matter, the Senate had not previously engaged in what Chief
Justice Rehnquist called a "prolonged interrogation" 1 96 to the
lengths featured in the Bork confirmation. Judge Bork himself
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee for97five days
with several sessions stretching late into the evemng.
The extent and character of the inquiry into Judge Bork's
judicial philosophy was more searching than in any past nomination. Chief Justice Rehnquist describes some of the difficulties
for the nominee:
[N]ot all members of the committee are present during any
particular phase of the questioning and therefore it is quite
possibdle for a nominee to have been subjected to extensive
questioning on a rather detailed point by one Senator, to be
followed shortly afterwards by virtually identical questioning
If the nominee were a witness in a
by another Senator
judicial proceeding, his attorney could protect him, at least in
our country, by objecting to the second line of questions ..
[O]ne of my adviBut alas, the nominee has no attorney
sers cautioned me to bear in mind that the Constitution ended
at the hearing room door.198
Judge Bork experienced precisely the difficulty described by
the Chief Justice. For example, on one issue-his judicial views
I" See, e.g., 133 CoNa. REc. S14,671 (daily ed. Ott. 21, 1987) (article by Sen.
Specter); 133 CO1kG. REc. S14,698-99 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 133 CONG. Rlc,
S14,807 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (statement of Sen. Packwood); S14,827 (statement of
Sen. DeConcini); 133 CoNG. Rac. S14,838 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
'" Address, supra note 2, at 7.
'7Hearings on Bork, supra note 28.
I" Address, supra note 2, at 7.
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on the standards for implementing the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment-Judge Bork was questioned in
detail at least eighteen separate times. 199 Indeed, every member
of the Committee, save one-thirteen in all-delved into the
same issue. 2 0 Moreover, the inquiry covered an amazing array
of issues, including the right to privacy, 20 judicial restraint, 202
voting rights, 20 3 wiretapping, 204 due process, 20 5 the Ninth Amendment, 201 women's rights, 2w and far more.

While the repetitiveness of the process does not in itself
suggest improprieties, the character of the questions and the type
of answers demanded by some questions can pose a threat to
principles of judicial independence. As the Chief Justice again
describes:
The difficulty comes when, because of dissatisfaction with a
putative judge's answer, or because of questions about the
frankness of the answer, the questions begin to go into great
detail. If judges were computers, all primed to spew out answers when the proper button was pushed, this would be a
permissible form of interrogation. But judges are not computers
judges should not and do not behave like legislators,
or like anyone else who is free to commit himself to a result
for reasons apart from the merits. Judges are called judges
because they 'judge' and to 'judge' is an infinitive which
connotes certain procedural prerequisites
Obviously [the
judging] process is something which cannot possibly be duplicated in a committee hearing room, and since it cannot be
duplicated no nominee who is both prudent and honest can

M"Hearingson Bork, supra note 28, at 133, 135 (Sen. Kennedy), 164 (Sen. Hatch),
227-29, 370-71 (Sen. DeConcini), 240 (Sen. Grassley), 260, 415-17, 580-81 (Sen. Specter),
267 (Sen. Heflin), 276 (Sen. Humphrey), 292-93, 421-22 (Sen. Simon), 306-07 (Sen.
Thurmond), 450-51 (Sen. Metzenbaum), 535 (Sen. Simpson), 560-64 (Chairman Biden),
620 (Sen. Leahy).
x' Id.
20

Id. at 87.

m Id. at 101.
201 Id.

at 130.

'I Id. at
20 Id. at
Id. at
= Id. at

217
291.
301.
324.
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give categorical answers to detailed questions of constitutional
law in the Senate confirmation hearings in our country 208
As intimated by the Chief Justice, the form and duration of
the scrutiny process can have an effect on questions related to
the judicial role. One Senator made specific reference to this
possibilityI am very troubled that the questiomng of the nominee
was too specific and too detailed. In effect, committee members were extracting campaign promises from the nominee who
gave them under oath. In doing this the Senate is seeking to
control the result of Supreme Court deliberations. In my opinion, this compromises the independence of the judiciary and
infringes on the separation of powers.
We have no business trying to get a nominee to decide
cases our way As a corollary, we must not deny confirmation
because a nominee would decide this case or that case contrary
to our preferences. It is not the proper role of the Senate to
dictate how specific cases must be decided as a condition of
confirmation. Never before has the Senate done so-until
now 2o

Judge Bork, unlike Justice O'Connor who had declined to
answer some questions on the grounds that she should avoid
prejudging future cases, responded in detail to questions about
his judicial philosophy 210 This triggered some heated exchanges
between the Senators and prompted one Senator to comment on
the difficulty of assessing the merits of a judicial candidate on
21
the basis of "thirty second bites" relative to complex issues. 1
At length, Judge Bork's nomination was defeated on a Senate vote of 42 to 58.212 The Senate, for the first time, had elected
to abandon most restraints when undertaking an inquiry into
judicial philosophy Instead the Senate adopted an unlimited
approach to philosophical inquiry

m Address, supra note 2, at 10-iI.
m 133 CONG. REc. S14,779 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (statement of Sen. Roth).
210 Hearingson Bork, supra note 28, at 153.
2,2 Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("these major issues are not easily explained in
30-second bites that we people in Congress are used to popping off about").
222Id. at 170.
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While the Bork nomination took the ideological scrutiny
function a step further (both in terms of purpose and process

of the scrutiny) than any prior Senate confirmation proceeding,
the aspect of the hearings that established an entirely unprecedented practice was the use of grass-roots political election tactics

to influence the outcome of the Senate vote. Most prior nomnations had taken place within the chambers of the Senate
without extensive public participation. This closed atmosphere
had enabled past Senators to defeat nominations on the basis of
senatorial courtesy

Unlike past -nomination proceedings, the Bork proceedings
quickly became a national political contest, complete with grassroots lobbying, full-page newspaper advertisements, fund-raising
appeals, thirty-second radio and television appeals, and letter-

writing campaigns. As the combatants strove to make their
point, their media appeals contained the kind of distortions
common in modern political contests. A Senate proponent of
Judge Bork's nomination exploited these distortions by identifying "67 falsehoods" in one full-page advertisement against
Judge Bork, 84 in another and 99 in still another. 213 To this, the

213 133 CONG. Ric. S14,692-97 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
These so-called "falsehoods" capsulize well the nature and form of the charges against
Judge Bork. For instande, the newspaper advertisement accused the Judge of sterilizing
workers. This charge referred to a case in which Judge Bork was called upon to help
decide whether a company policy reserving some jobs for infertile women was a "hazard"
as defined by the Occupational Hazard and Safety Act. See Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Umon v. Amencan Cyammd Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The unammous three-judge panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that Congress
had not defined "hazard" to include policies. The Circuit therefore concluded that
Congress had failed to pfovide an adequate definition of "hazard." The women involved
in this unfortunate set of circumstances were not even parties to the case decided by
Judge Bork. They had already been compensated for their injuries under a separate suit.
As might be expected in a brief one-page advertisement, the totality of circumstances
Was not described.
Another allegation in the same ad suggested that Judge Bork "billed consumers"
for power they never received. Neither Judge Bork nor any court was empowered by
law to "bill a consumer." It was the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC)
job to review rates. Cities of Anaheim and Riverside, Califorma v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 692 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1982). In three rehearings of this case,
Judge Bork and the majority of his colleagues did not order FERC to bill anyone, but
determined that FERC had not adequately addressed the evidence in the case. At the
time of the Bork hearings, no consumer had yet been billed at all.
Judge Bork was also charged with endorsing "poll taxes and literacy tests
to
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successful opponents of Judge Bork identified flaws in the advertising in favor of Judge Bork and appropriately disclaimed

responsibility for the mass media errors of special interest
4
21

groups .
A significant portion of the Senate floor debate on the Bork
nomination featjired charges against outside advertising, polling,

and fund-raising.21 5 As mentioned earlier, however, the Bork
debate spread beyond the bounds of the Senate to a degree

unrivaled in any prior confirmation proceeding. Whereas Rutledge, Cushing, Taney, and a few others suffered rejection when

they became ensnared in political affairs raging in the general
forum of public affairs, Judge Bork himself became the central
focus of political affairs. Moreover, Judge Bork's views, correctly and incorrectly portrayed, were the subject of political
gamesmanship. The fervent political issue of the day was whether
Judge Bork should be allowed to reshape the positions of the
216
Supreme Court with his proposed one-ninth influence.
At this juncture, Judge Bork issued his appeal about effects

on the independence of the judiciary With some time for reflection, most objective viewers can endorse Chief Justice Rehnquist's assessment:
President Reagan is regarded as a philosophical conservative,
and Judge Bork was a distinguished federal judge rightly regarded as having a conservative judicial philosophy All of the
liberal elements in the United States mobilized to defeat his
confirmation.

keep minorities from voting." This allegation was wrong both with respect to the law
involved and Judge Bork's position. In fact, the Supreme Court's decisions in both the
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966) cases were not decided on the basis of allegations of racial discnmination. Moreover, Judge Bork stated on the record that if racial discrimination had
been a factor in either decision, he would have endorsed, rather than academically
questioned, the opimon.
214 133 CoNo. REc. S14,661, S14,718-23 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Biden).
225 Id., id. at S14,713; 133 CoNG. Rac. S14,769 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1987) ("McCarthy style tactics") (statement of Sen. Symms); 133 CONG. REc. S14,915, S14,927
(daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987).
216 See, e.g., news articles reprinted in 133 CONG. REc. S14,716-17 (daily ed. Oct.
21, 1987); 133 CONG. RPc. S14,771-73.
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I think I speak for a great number of my fellow citizens
of the United States when I say that there is a general feeling
of dissatisfaction with the process attending Judge Bork's nomination, a feeling which is shared by many of those who were
happy to see him demed confirmation. 217
In sum, if nominations were to be decided on the basis of what
the public can be made to believe about a nominee's judicial
philosophy, the notion of a federal judiciary detached from

influences of public opinion and political pressure may be affected.
After Judge Bork was rejected by the Senate and Judge
Ginsburg fell victim to questions of ethics, President Reagan
nominated Ninth Circuit Judge Anthony Kennedy After a process which featured once again detailed and repetitive questions
about judicial philosophy within lengthy Judiciary Committee
hearings, Judge Kennedy was unanimously confirmed.
IX.

WHEN TO SCRUTINIZE: CHECKING THE PRESIDENT'S

FAVORITISM
The Senate has a need to derive, to the extent possible within
a changeable political body, some uniform understandings and
policies for the conduct of confirmation proceedings. Relying
upon the Constitution's history and the record of past confirmations, the Senate would be well served to adhere to a general
rule of avoiding scrutiny of a nominee's judicial philosophy
As articulated by Chairman Biden, however, the framers
clearly intended that the Senate would act as a check on excesses
within the nomnnating function. It follows therefore that the
Senate should serve as a check on the President's use of ideological factors in the nomnation process. This particular checking function is easily implemented where the President nominates
solely on the basis of political or ideological preferences. In such
a situation, the Senate generally can identify a lack of qualifications or a lapse in ethical propriety or some other fatal deficiency in the candidate. Carswell may well have fit into this
category Some opponents of Judge Bork suggested that he fit

217

Address, supra note 2.
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into this category because President Reagan was attempting to
"remake the Supreme Court in his own image. ' 218
When, howevdr, the President has not nominated solely on
the basis of judicial philosophy, the Senate must again weigh
carefully the consequences of exercising its checking fdnction. If
the Senate persists in demanding satisfaction of iti own ideological preferences, the inevitable interbranch confrontation could
precititate a constitutional crisis.
Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe acknowledges this
threat in these terms: "In Supreme Court appointments, the
Constitution allows only the President his 'druthers.' Allowing
each Senator to confirm solely from the Senator's own 'short
list' would prescribe paralysis in the Supreme Court appointment
process. ' 21 9 Thus, the basic distinction between the President's
and the Senate's prerogatives requires the Senate "only to react,
not to create.'"' Accordingly, the Senate, in reacting, has the
primary responsibility to avoid compromising the appointive
power. If the Senate insists on confirming only justices likely to
vote in accordance with a majority of the Senate on judicial
issues, it would deny the President his constitutional prerogatives
and virtually assert a power to select nominees that the Senate
was not intended to possess. Accordingly, the Senate must elect
to exercise its check only in those rare instances in history where
the President has clearly overstepped the bounds of appropriate
discretion in the appointment process.
X.

SCOPE OF SCRUTINY: THEATS TO AN INDEPENDENT
JUDICIARY

When setting a standard for those few instances when scrutiny of judicial philosophy may be warranted, the Senate should
consider the merits of some self-restraint. At the outset of the

Republic, the framers understood that the process for selecting
judges would contribute to and perpetuate the unique character

of the nonpolitical branch. Yet, if the Senate, during repeated
confirmation processes, treats the Supreme Court as a political
",

133 CoNG. REc. S10,523.

2"

L. TRmE, supra note 3.
Id. at 131.
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institution that it expects to hue to a particular ideological orthodoxy, then the unique independent character of the Court
could be tarnished.
Professor Richard Freidman discusses this threat in these
terms:
Rarely is public attention focused on the Court as intensely as
dunng a confirmation struggle. Extended debates, both within
the Senate and beyond, concermng recent deciions and the
political philosophy of a nominee cannot help but dinmish the
Court's reputation as an independent institution and impress
upon the public-and indeed upon the Court itself-a political
pprception of its role
A Justice who reaches the Court
only in the face of doubts concermng his ideological acceptability may bear scars that will affect his judicial behavior.
Perhaps more clearly and more importantly, if unpopular Supreme Court decisions tend to lead to nasty confirmation
controversies that put the Court in an unfavorable light, then
it is natural to expect that the Court will be less willing to
render such decisions?'21
Another danger inherent in excessive scrutiny of judicial
philosophy is the risk of political reprisals. If blocking a nomination on grounds of judicial philosophy is fair game for one
President or party, it is fair game for the other as well. This
could degenerate very quickly into an endless cycle of revenge
and retribution which can only damage the institutional standing
of both the Senate and the Court. At the conclusion of the Bork
debate, one conservative Senator noted that he had consistently
supported qualified judicial candidates with a "liberal" judicial
philosophy He asserted that he would no longer follow the rule
which gives a presumption to the merits of a President's nomination. He vowed to reject nominees on the bsis of political
preference. This is the kind of talk, which, if put into action,
can only spell danger for the impartiality of the judicial selection
process.
XI.

OVERT POLITICS

Observers of the Senate confirmation process in the past
have noted that "the Senate has at various times made purely

2'

Freidman, supra note 4, at 1317
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political decisions in its consideration of Supreme Court nonunees. ' ?m One of the institutional strengths of the Senate is its
political character. In addition to ensuring responsiveness to the
electorate, the Senate's political character makes it sensitive to,
and able to check, political excesses in the House and in the
Executive. In dealing with the nonpolitical affairs of the judicial
branch, hqwever, the Senate must also be sensitive to the potential long-range effects of overly politicized confirmation proceedings.
In the Reconstruption Era, politics ruled the confirmation
process and the Supreme Court was subject to crass political
patronage.2 3 While that era is not likely to return, it illustrates
the dangers of excessive partisanship in Supreme Court selection
decisions.
Another commentator has observed that "political involvement in the selection of justices is a two-edged sword whose
backswing has the potential to injure the prestige and independepce of the Court as much as or more than its thrusts have the
chance to rephape jurisprudential directions." 4 Recognizing this
precise danger, the Senate refused to employ political litmus
tests while confirming fifty-four justices over the past century
CONCLUSION
During confirmation proceedings, as at no other time, the
Senate Interfaces with the third branch. When determining the
propriety and scope of ideological inquiries during confirmation
proceedings, the Senate's advice and consent processes would be
more consistent and less intrusive if undertaken pursuant to some
established guidelines. The history of the Constitution and prior
Senate practice, with few exceptions, provide those standards.
In the first place, the Senate should undertake scrutiny of a
nominee's judicial philosophy only rarely and reluctantly The
norm should be to refrain from delving into a candidate's views

m McConnell, supra note 9, at 13.
m See Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court Nom-

inations: From Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CAPDozo L.
REv. 1, 26-30 (1983).
22 Hatch, supra note 13, at 1352.
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in a manner that might be perceived as an attempt to influence
Supreme Court jurisprudence by denying otherwise worthy nominees a seat on the bench. On rare occasions, however, the Sehate
may consciously determine that a President has overstepped the
bounds of propriety in seeking to remold the constituency of the
Court. Then the Senate's role as a check of presidential "favoritism" may justify a restrained scrutiny of a nominee's judicial
views.
With regard to the scope of an ideological inquiry on these
occasions when warranted as a check, an unlimited review could
entail gridlock or diminution of the independent role of the
judiciary Accordingly, a more restrained standard of inquiry
into judicial philosophy would both permit the Senate to perform
its constitutional role and protect the institutional integrity, independence, and individuality of the judicial branch.
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APPENDIX
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES NOT
CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE*
Nominee

President

Senate Action

1. William Paterson
2. John Rutledge
3. Alexander Wolcott
4. John Crittenden
5. Roger Taney
6. John Spencer
7. Reuben Walworth
8. Edward King
9. Edward King
10. John Read
11. George Woodward
12. Edward Bradford
13. George Badger
14. William Micou
15. Jeremiah Black
16. Henry Stanberry
17. Ebnezer Hoar
18. George Williams
19. Caleb Cushing
20. Stanley Matthews
21. William Hornblower
22. Wheeler Peckham
23. John J. Parker
24. Abe Fortas
25. Homer Thornberry
26. Clement Haynsworth
27. G. Harrold Carswell
28. Douglas Ginsburg
29. Robert H. Bork

Washington
Washington
Madison
J.Q. Adams
Jackson
Tyler
Tyler
Tyler
Tyler
Tyler
Polk
Fillmore
Fillmore
Fillmore
Buchanan
Johnson
Grant
Grant
Grant
Hayes
Cleveland
Cleveland
Hoover
Johnson
Johnson
Nixon
Nixon
Reagan
Reagan

Withdrawn
Rejected (10/14)
Rejected (9/24)
Postponed
Postponed (24/21)
Rejected (21/26)
Withdrawn
Postponed
Withdrawn
Not Acted Upon
Rejected (20/29)
Not Acted Upon
Postponed
Not Acted Upon
Rejected (25/26)
Not Acted Upon
Rejected (24/23)
Withdrawn
Withdrawn
Not Acted Upon
Rejected (24/30)
Rejected (32/41)
Rejected (39/41)
Withdrawn
Not Acted Upon
Rejected (45/55)
Rejected (45/51)
Withdrawn
Rejected (42/58)

Rationale
T
P1

Q
L

P2
A
A
A
A
L
L
A
L
L
L
L
P3

Q
P4
P5
S
S
P6
L, E
U
E
Q
E
P7

* Note: This appendix covers 29 nominees. The Article discusses 28 nominees.
The difference is William Paterson (1) who was a member of the Congress
when first nominated and thus ineligible under article I, section 6, clause 2.
His nomination was resubmitted after expiration of his elected term and he
was confirmed.
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E
L
Q
S
T
U
P

=
=
=
=
=
=
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Not confirmed because of Senate antipathy to the President.
Not confirmed because of ethics concerns.
Not confirmed because of lame duck status of the President.
Not confirmed because of qualifications concerns.
Not confirmed on grounds of senatorial courtesy.
Withdrawn as improperly timed, resubmitted and confirmed.
Position.for which nomination made unavailable.
Arguably politically based rejections, as explained below.

1. Rutledge was rejected after publicly condemning the Jay Treaty, one
of the most emotional political issues of the eighteenth century. It also became
apparent during the confirmation that Rutledge suffered from fits of insanity.
2. Taney was rejected because he carried out President Jackson's orders
to remove government deposits from the Bank of the United States. When
Jackson subsequently nominated him for Chief Justice, Taney was confirmed
by a vote of 29 to 15.
3. Hoar was rejected because he had opposed the impeachment of President Johnson and had supported Civil Service reform.
4. Cushing was attacked as a political chameleon; his name was withdrawn
after it was discovered that he wrote a friendly letter of introduction to
Jefferson Davis in march 1861.
5. Although initially rejected as a tool of corporate interests and because
of ethical concerns, Matthews was later renominated by President Garfield and
confirmed by the Senate.
6. Parker was rejected because of alleged insensitivity to labor and racial
problems. Parker continued as a judge on the Fourth Circuit.
7. Bork was rejected because a majority of the Senate disagreed with his
views on a wide variety of judicial issues. -

